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STS-55 PAD ABORT FINAL REPORT
- INTRODUCTION -
The STS-55 initial launch attempt of Columbia (OV102) was terminated on KSC launch
i pad A March 22, 1993 at 9:51 AM E.S.T. due to violation of an ME-3 (Engine 2011)
\ Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) limit exceedance. The event description and timeline are
i summarized in Figure 1 .
) Propellant loading was initiated on 22 March, 1993 at 1:15 AM EST. All SSME chill
} parameters and launch commit criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.44
| seconds a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 201 1 for exceeding the
50 psia Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) purge pressure redline. The engine was shut down at
1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2034 and 2030. All shut down sequences were
;' nominal and the mission was safely aborted. Figure 2 depicts the OPB purge pressure
redline violation, and Figure 3 depicts the abort profile/overlay for all three engines.
SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review
of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure
indications other than the single FID 013-414, OPB purge pressure redline exceeded.
Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous
controller software operation.
Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was
assembled (Table I). The team successfully isolated the failure cause to the oxidizer
preburner augmented spark igniter purge check valve not fully closed due to
contamination. The source of the contaminant was traced to a cut segment from a rubber
0-ring which was used in a fine clean tool during valve production prior to 1992. The
valve was apparently contaminated during its fabrication in 1985. The valve had
performed acceptably on four previous flights of the engine, and SSME flight history
shows 780 combined check valve flights without failure.
The failure of an Engine 3 (SSME No. 2011) check valve to close was sensed by on-
board engine instruments even though all other engine operations were normal. This
resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior
to ignition of the solid boosters.
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INVESTIGATION TEAM
BYRON WOOD
ROCKETDYNE
JOHN PLOWDEN
PAUL SEITZ
GARY SMITH
LORIN BLEWETT
VINCE WHEELOCK
NASA
CHUCK VERSCHOORE (NASA)
MIKE LEBERMAN (NASA)
JOHN LASZAR (NASA)
MIKE KYNARD (NASA)
• FAULT TREE
• DATA/TIMELINE
• TEST CORRELATIONS
• VALVE DESIGN/DISASSEMBLY
• AVIONICS
• RELIABILITY
• MATERIALS ASSESSMENT
• TRANSIENT ANALYSIS
• TURNAROUND REQUIREMENTS
• THERMAL ANALYSIS
SAFETY & FINAL REPORT
PHIN JONES
ERICH ESPENSCHIED
MIKE CARLSON
CRAIG STOKER
BEN ODLE
ART HILL
AL OLSEN
TOM LEE
FRAN DOEHRER
JOHN SCHNEIDER
SANDY PETERSON
TED SCHULDT
MARC BOUFFARD
PAT O'KELLEY
JON FRANDSEN
SUSAN STERN
RICH NELSON
SCOT BOTTEMILLER
JOHN FASHEH
REY PRINCIPE
TRITRAN
JIM JEPSKY
DENNIS ROMINE
JIM BEITZEL/JOE MARDON
NOTE: Dr. Walter Williams (consultant to Aerospace Safety Advisory Board) was
an observer in most team activities.
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STS-55 ON-PAD ABORT
TEAM FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Tables 1 and 2 summarize key generic findings of the team, and expected corrective
actions. Many of these actions were put in place after two contaminated valve cases
during build were discovered in July of 1991.
Tables 3 thru 8 summarize the combined recommendations of the team for near term and
long term action. The SSME Program should give serious and timely consideration to all
of these recommendations.
Figure 1 summarizes check valve combined leakage data thru May 1993 and clearly
illustrates the need to evaluate several check valve sets in the fleet. While the screening
process recommended does not ensure contamination free operation it does provide a
high degree of confidence to minimize the potential for PAD-ABORT. The team does not
recommend the removal and replacement of valves in the field if they pass the defined
screening process on the basis this issue is not a safety-of-flight concern.
Figure 2 on a conservative analysis basis dramatically illustrates the leakage sensitivity
of the check valves to very small contamination levels which could result in limit
exceedance. Limit settings of 50, 100 and 300 psi are shown. This necessitates clear
action be taken to either desensitize the system to critical leakage, seek better redline
monitoring and settings or take steps to further protect and preclude contamination entry
in the first place.
The analysis results shown in Figure 3 illustrates the limitations on the FPB Augmented
Spark Igniter (ASI) check valve stroke to preclude critical failure backflow with the present
system. Table 9 provides the backflow margin for the other four valves in the oxidizer
system. In Figure 4 a redline setting on the order of 700 psi would preclude an
unnecessary pad abort for three of the five valves in the system.
Under lessons learned the team found that work in the boattail is very difficult, brings with
it non-standard conditions and can have negative results. During the course of this
investigation it was discovered that the leak check configuration in the boattail allowed
for a parasitic leak path from HPOTP intermediate seal. Combined CV leak checks with
this condition resulted in misleading data and resulted in unnecessary isolation leak
checks on Engine 2024. During the isolation leak checks, which required the system to
be opened up, contamination was inadvertently introduced into the system and
subsequently resulted in the replacement of an otherwise acceptable check valve. The
program should avoid the violation of closed systems to the maximum extent possible.
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FAILURE TREE DESCRIPTION
The failure tree for the Oxidizer Preburner Purge Pressure redline violation is shown in
the Figure 1. The first branch of the tree distinguishes between two possible failure
modes, 1) a real pressure increase causing the redline violation, and 2) a false redline
violation, either an erroneous posting of the redline, or an erroneous pressure increase.
The tree then identifies all components that could have caused the failure, and then
further branches into possible failure modes of each component. Components were
eliminated as failure candidates by post abort testing, data review, and/or system
analysis.
The Oxidizer Preburner ASI purge check valve was identified as the failed component by
special leak tests and also by data analysis. Discussion of the data analysis is contained
in the STS-55 Abort Signature Correlation section of this report. Check valve teardown
and inspection identified the failure mode as contamination on the sealing surface that
was introduced into the check valve during the check valve fabrication process.
Components that could cause a false pressure indication are the controller, sensor, or
harnesses. These failure paths were eliminated by data analysis of the pressure increase
signature on both the Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) and Fuel Preburner (FPB) purge
pressures. All characteristics of both traces appear real.
Components exonerated from causing the real pressure increase in the OPB and FPB
purge pressures are the GN2 Purge Supply Ground Support Equipment (GSE), SSME
Solenoid Valves, Oxidizer Control Valves, and Pressure Actuated Valves.
The GN2 Supply GSE is made up of solenoid valves, regulators, and hand valves. If the
GN2 supply were activated, the purge pressure would cause the OPB Purge pressure
redline violation. It was eliminated by data review that showed the Supply Panel outlet
pressure indicated ambient at the time of the failure. Also, the other engines showed no
evidence of increased GN2 supply pressure.
SSME solenoid valves that could cause an increase in OPB purge pressure are the
Preburner Shutdown Purge, Emergency Shutdown, and POGO Precharge Solenoids. If
the Preburner Shutdown Purge Solenoid were energized, helium would fill the purge
supply and cause a redline violation. The Emergency Shutdown Solenoid could cause
an OPB pressure increase if leakage was great enough into the solenoid vent system,
which in turn vents to the Oxidizer Component Drain causing back pressure to flow into
the OPB purge system. Leakage of the Helium Precharge Solenoid could flow into the
Helium Precharge Valve (HPV) "Backdoor Actuation" control port. Pressure in that line
can cause actuation of Pressure Actuated Valves PAV4 and PAV5 allowing helium to flow
into the Preburner Purge System. Review of controller solenoid monitors showed that no
solenoid was incorrectly energized during the failure. Review of emergency shutdown
pressure showed there was no leakage from the Emergency Shutdown Solenoid and
review of the POGO Precharge pressure did not indicate there was activation of the
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Helium Precharge Valve. Also PAV4 and PAV5 actuation by the HPV "Backdoor
Actuation" port has a different signature than the OPB & FPB purge pressures exhibited.
The SSME Oxidizer Control Valves are the Main Oxidizer Valve, the Fuel Preburner
Oxidizer Valve, and the Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve. Shaft seal leakage from
these valves drains into the Oxidizer Component Drain. Choked flow in this line would
cause an increase in the OPB purge pressure system. Post abort leak tests of the
Oxidizer Control Valve shaft seals identified no anomalies with these valve shaft seals.
Shaft seal leakage from these valves is included in the preburner purge check valve
combined leak test.
The Pressure Actuated Valves that could cause this failure are PAV4, PAV5, and PAV6.
PAV4 and PAV5 leakage would allow helium to pressurize the purge system causing the
redline violation. If PAV6 was failed in the open position, leakage from the OPB and FPB
check valves would be trapped and pressure would increase. The combined allowed
leakage from the check valves could cause the OPB purge pressure redline violation.
PAV4 and PAV5 were eliminated by data review which showed there was no pressure
increase until Preburner Pressure increased. A helium leak past PAV4 or PAV5 would
cause a steady pressure increase from the beginning of the Engine Start sequence.
PAV6 was exonerated by review of the OPB and FPB purge pressures when the GN2
supply pressure was terminated. The OPB and FPB pressures clearly show an increased
decay rate when the GN2 supply decreases to 85 PSIA. This is indicative of PAV6
opening when the control port pressure decreases below the required actuation pressure.
All possible causes of Oxidizer Preburner Purge pressure redline violation are identified
on the failure tree. Post abort testing, data review, and/or system analysis identified the
OPB ASI purge check valve as the failed component and exonerated all other
components as the failure cause.
Based on the evidence compiled in the investigation and detailed application of fault tree
logic the most probable failure scenario is summarized in Figure 2.
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Section 4.0
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FAILURE SIGNATURE CORRELATION
In analyzing the data that resulted in the abort, it is important to note that both the OPB
and FPB purge pressure sensors showed an increase and the increase in pressures
followed engine thrust build-up. This data is characteristic of purge check valve reverse
leakage. Table 1 provides a list of previous purge check valve reverse leakage
experience. The fact that this is a clear cut signature enabled the team to concentrate
on this branch of the fault tree (Figure 1) (although the other branches were analyzed to
insure completeness).
The next step was to determine which of the five check valves caused the abort. Figure
2 provides a comparison of the STS-55 abort with previous purge check valve failures.
In analyzing the data from Engine 2011, it was noted that the FPB purge pressure lagged
the OPB purge pressure and the FPB purge pressure was approximately 80% of the OPB
purge pressure. An orifice located upstream of PAV 5 in the PCA (Figure 3) creates a
lag between the pressure being registered on the two sensors. If the FPB dome purge
check valve (016.3) had leaked, the OPB purge pressure would have lagged the FPB
purge pressure (see Figure 2). The fact that the opposite occurred eliminates the FPB
dome purge check valve (016.3) as the cause of the abort.
The MCC dome purge check valve (08.4) was then analyzed. Figure 2 shows three prior
cases of MCC dome purge check valve leakage. Engine 2011 data does not match the
MCC dome purge check valve (08.4) leakage characteristics and therefore eliminates this
valve as the cause of the abort.
The remaining three check valves (FPB ASI purge (016.1.4), OPB ASI purge (012.1.4)
and OPB dome purge (012.3)) all produce results similar to those seen on Engine 2011:
The FPB purge pressure lags the OPB purge pressure and the system configuration is
such that the FPB purge pressure would be approximately 80% of the OPB purge
pressure. Figure 2 shows data from FPB ASI and OPB ASI purge check valve failures.
Further analysis based on modeling, previous check valve failures and data from TTB
Engine 3001, revealed the following: leakage of the FPB ASI purge check valve (016.1.4)
results in a OPB purge pressure which follows the average of PBP discharge pressure
and FPB PC. OPB ASI purge check valve (012.1.4) leakage results in a OPB purge
pressure which follows the average of PBP discharge pressure and OPB PC. Finally, the
OPB purge pressure would follow PBP discharge pressure in the case of OPB dome
purge check valve (012.3) leakage.
Analysis of Engine 2011 data from the STS-55 abort shows that OPB purge pressure lags
PBP discharge pressure. This lack of correlation between OPB purge pressure and PBP
discharge pressure exonerates the FPB dome purge check valve (012.3) as the cause
of the abort. Comparison of OPB purge pressure and the average of PBP discharge
pressure and FPB PC also shows a lack of correlation (Figure 4), eliminating FPB ASI
purge check valve (012.1.4) leakage as the cause of the abort. In the flight sensor
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configuration, OPB PC is not recorded and therefore a direct comparison to the average
of PBP discharge pressure and OPB PC could not be made. However, a comparison of
Engine 2011 OPB and FPB purge pressure data and data from a prior OPB ASI purge
check valve failure (Figure 5) shows a good correlation.
The lack of correlation with other purge check valve failure signatures and the good
correlation to the OPB ASI purge check valve (012.1.4) failure data led to the conclusion
on that the OPB ASI purge check valve (012.1.4) caused the abort.
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STS-55 ABORT AND FPB ASI CHECK VALVE FAILURE COMPARISON
350
300
250
200
TEST 901-417 - FPB ASI CHK VALVE (016.1.4) FAILURE
Pi
Or, 150
00
so
AVERAGE OF PBPDS PR
AND FPB PC DIVIDED BY 4
FPB S/D PRO PR
0.8 1.2
TIME FROM ENGINE START (SECS)
STS 55 ME-3 ABORT
^ 300
UJ
200
on
00
100
AVERAGE OF PBP DS PR
AND FPB PC DIVIDED BY 4
FPB S/D PRG PR
0.00 0.80 1JO 1.60
TIME FROM ENGINE START (SECS)
FIGURE 4
4-8
STS-55 ABORT AND OPB ASI CHECK VALVE FAILURE COMPARISON
250
200
00
Pj., 150
IXQi
D
00
OPB S/D PURGE PRESSURE COMPARISON
onUJ
100 -
TEST 902-331
OPBASICKVLV(O12.
STS 55 ME-3
0.40 0.80 1.20
TIME FROM ENGINE START (SECS) 1.60 2.00
200
FPB S/D PURGE PRESSURE COMPARISON
1503
00
0.
tu
100
00
00
UJ
Qi
TEST 902-331
OPB ASI CK VLV (O12.
STS 55 ME-3
0.40 0.80 1.20 1.60
TIME FROM ENGINE START (SECS)
FIGURE 5
4-9
Section 5.0
OPB ASI Purge Check Valve Failure Analysis
RSS-8898
5-1
RSS-8898
6/23/93
OPB ASI PURGE CHECK VALVE FAILURE ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
A combined leak check was performed on Engine 2011 to verify the check valve leakage.
The leakage measured was within acceptable limits (Table 1). After a five minute GN2
purge, the combined leakage was 790 scim. Isolation tests were run. The OPB ASI
Purge Check Valve leaked 468 scim and 581 scim at H and 25 psig respectively.
The check valve was visually examined at Canoga. One non-metallic particle was
observed in the poppet/body annulus. Leakage measured at Canoga was 240 and 460
scim at 10 and 25 psig. Radiographic inspection did not locate any contamination or a
poppet/seat gap. The two welds were machined to disassemble the valve. Contaminants
found were analyzed by Materials, Engineering & Technology (ME&T). The largest
particle found measured .146 X .046 X .018 inches (Figure 1). The material was nitrile
rubber. The contamination apparently occurred during valve build in 1985. Evidence
indicated a piece of 0-ring was severed as a manufacturing fixture was installed for final
assembly cleaning. A similar situation occurred in 1991 that resulted in a modification to
the fixture and changes to its assembly procedures.
In July 1991 two check valves in build were similarly found contaminated with nitrile O-
ring material. One was detected by an in-process leak check and one by visual
inspection. At that time the contamination source was traced to the flushing fixture and
several actions were put in place:
1) The planning was changed to provide clear installation procedures.
2) The fixture was changed to reduce susceptibility to 0-ring damage.
3) The operation was brought into the valve assembly room to bring under the
control of experienced valve technicians.
4) Requirements for inspection of the 0-ring were added to the planning.
At the time the generic impact of the two discrepancies was evaluated at the valve
fabrication team level. No UCR was written and at the time policy was vague as to
whether one should be written. The valve fabrication team assessed the problem to be
only an issue with the two valves in build on the bases of the following:
1) No prior evidence of similar contamination in any other build.
2) No prior evidence of similar contamination in any failure in-house or out-of-house.
3) The condition was easily detected during build.
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4) Fluid leak check would detect problems with delivered valves.
5) Lox compatibility was not an issue since there was no contamination issue.
The poppet and body were reassembled using manufacturing fixtures (without welding).
Leak tests were run from 10 psig to 5000 psig. The maximum leakage was .62 scim at
100 psig. Review of check valve PAR'S for leakage caused by contamination, showed
twenty-nine check-valves contained particles large enough to analyze. All contained
materials not used in the check valves, and no other cases of rubber 0-ring material were
found.
Test & Teardown
OPB ASI Purge Line Assembly P/N R0010828-031, S/N 4925685
Purge Check Valve Assembly P/N RS008059-141, S/N 4873034
The valve was received from KSC with no evidence of physical damage. The covers
were removed and the assembly was visually inspected for contamination. One piece of
contamination was observed between the poppet head outside diameter and the body.
The contaminant was white and nonmetallic.
The line assembly was installed in the manufacturing test console per Figure 2. A
millipore filter was installed in the discharge line to collect any contaminants dislodged
during the test. The valve was leak tested at 10 and 25 psig inlet pressure to duplicate
the KSC tests. Leakage was measured with a ball type flowmeter. The test fluid was
ambient temperature helium.
Pressure
(psia)
Leakage
(scim)
240
460
KSC Data
(scim)
468
581
New Valve
MFG. Allowable
(scim)
10
10
11
25
Because further testing could cause critically located contaminants to be lost, leakage
tests were not conducted at higher pressure levels. The filter had no contamination.
The valve was separated from the line with a chipless cutter. The valve was held with
the inlet down and a suction was maintained around the cutting area with a vacuum
cleaner. After separation, the inlet was lightly deburred to remove loose burrs while
maintaining the suction. The outside of the valve was hand wiped to remove any external
contamination.
Based on the KSC isolation leak test data, the gap between the poppet and seat was
calculated to provide information of the approximate flow path. Channel flow was
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selected for the analysis, because the leakage flow indicated that the height of the leak
path would be small compared to the length (width of seat). For 468 scim at 11 psig the
calculated gap was .00057 inches. For 581 scim at 25 psig the calculated gap was
.00040 inches. The change in gap suggested that the trapped contaminant was probably
a soft material which compressed under the increased load.
The inlet and outlet of the valve were protected with closures. The valve was inspected
by radiographic methods to determine if contamination could be detected and if the
leakage gap would be visible. The results were negative. The inspection did show that
the end coil of the spring slightly overlapped the adjacent coil at the retainer end.
Because the check valve is a welded assembly, it can only be disassembled by
machining the welds (Figure 3). The inlet and outlet were protected to minimize the
possibility of contamination. The machining was done on a lathe. No cutting oil was
used. Weld number two was machined until is was almost through. The separation was
accomplished by tapping lightly with a mallet. The retainer was removed by an axial cut
to remove weld number one. The poppet was prevented from rotating by a bolt loaded
from the outlet fixture into the poppet head. The spring was restrained with LOX tape to
hold the parts when the weld was cut through.
The poppet and body were set on a clean piece of aclar. The parts were separated by
lifting the body up off the poppet. The largest contaminant particle was found on the
poppet outboard of the seat. The particle measured .146 X .046 X .018 inches (Figure
1) and was identified by ME&T as nitrile rubber, Table II (Ref. 1, Table II, IDCR 987174).
The shape and material identified the source of the particle as a piece of O-ring from
manufacturing tooling (Figure 4). The tooling is used during the fine clean of the check
valve assembly. The installation procedure prior to 1991 was to assemble the fixture as
shown in Figure 4 with the screws finger tight. The check valve was then inserted from
the plate end by pushing the check valve cap tube through the O-ring into the fixture
body. The sharp edge of the cap tube could nibble the O-ring as it passed through and
the flushing operation would push the particles into the valve. These conditions were
established when evaluating checkvalves contamination found in 1991. No other
instances of O-ring nibbling were known prior to the 1991 instance. The test fixture was
modified as shown in Figure 4. The assembly procedures were changed to put the plate
and O-ring on the tube and then put the body on and install and tighten the screws. The
O-ring is also now visually inspected both before installation and when the fixture is
removed. These changes were incorporated in 1991 and the STS-55 failed the valve was
built in 1985. Two cotton particles and three nylon particles were found on the aclar
sheet. Because they were not observed on the body or poppet their location could not
be identified and they could not be positively traced to the valve. A black residue at the
bottom of the poppet bore was identified as carbon. The source of the residue is not
known.
The poppet and body were reassembled using fixtures which are used to verify the
poppet/body seal prior to welding. The maximum leakage was .623 scim at 100 psig test
pressure. The test results are shown in Table III. The poppet was pushed open
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manually and allowed to return with the spring load. There was no evidence of sticking
or binding.
The "as received" leak tests verified the KSC leakage although the Canoga results were
lower. The retest with clean parts verified the integrity of the poppet and body sealing
surface. The manual valve actuation eliminated valve sticking as a possible cause. This
leaves contamination as the most probable cause of leakage and the piece of nitrite
rubber as the most probable suspect. The .018 thickness would allow the particle to pass
through the seat lands but is too thick to have been trapped across the seal and only
cause the amount of leakage measured. The particle was shaved off the inside of an 0-
ring by a cylindrical tube and was tapered at the ends. The rubber particle was long
enough so that if it lay in a radial position one end would contact the outside of the body
before the inner end cleared the seat (Figure 5 & 6).
An analysis was conducted to assess the possibility of valve leakage induced by the
contaminant being wedged at the poppet O.D. to housing gap. Using the experimentally
determined bulk modules data of Figure 7 and recognizing a 4 to 10 factor change with
temperature two analyses were performed. One assuming the particle is trapped at the
O.D. cavity, Figure 8 and one with a thin piece of nitrile under the seat, Figure 9. It was
concluded from these results that a segment of the particle under the seat was most likely
mechanism.
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ME&T CONTAMINATION ANALYSES RESULTS - SSME 2011
! RS008059-141 CHECK VALVE. S/N 4873034{R0010828-031 CHECK VALVE LINE ASSY, S/N 4925685)
'•:':'•• I:--:-:-:-"' T.V- ;^:., •,,",, .- . ' - • - IDCR 9 87 17 4 ( # 1)
PARTICLE
LABEL
A
B
C
D
E
F
BLACK
RESIDUE
BLACK
PARTICLE
POPPET
SEAL
SURFACE
TAPE
CONT.
DIMENSIONS(INCHES)
.045 X .011 X
.002
.104 X .015
.041 X .038
.045 X .025 X
.005
.077 X .040 X
.004
.022 X .010
-
.146 X .046 X
.018
—
.096 X .023
IDENTIFICATION
NYLON W/ COTTON
FIBER
COTTON
COTTON
NYLON
NYLON
NYLON
MAJOR CARBON
NITRILE RUBBER
INSUFFICIENT
SAMPLE PRESENT
FOR CONCLUSIVE
RESULTS
COTTON
COMMENTS
AFTER CUT APART, GATHERED FROM
ACLAR SURFACE FOLLOWING VALVE
DISASSEMBLY
n
«
tf
n
MOST LIKELY FROM PARTICLE E
LOCATED UNDER POPPET CAP
LOCATED ON POPPET FACE
SWAB SAMPLE TAKEN OF POPPET
SEAL FACES
LOCATED ON ADHESIVE SIDE OF
TAPE USED AS MASK FOR VALVE
INLET
TABLE 2
5-7
CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE
POPPET 7 BODY REASSEMBLED WITH TOOLING
TEST FLUID-HELIUM
PRESSURE LEAKAGE
(PSIG) (SCIM)
10 <.4*
25 <.4
100 .623
500 .501
1000 <4
2000 <4
5000 <.4
*.4 SCIM IS THE LOWEST MEASUREMENT POSSIBLE FOR THE
FLOWMETER
TABLE 3
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SEAT LEAKAGE TEST SETUP
TYPICAL FOR USING STANDARD CONSOLE
VENT
HELIUM
SUPPLY
PORT
FR1B
V2 R6 V6
TEST ARTICt F
CHECK VALVE
LINE ASSEMBLY
PORT 1
RELIEF
VALVE
G6
V26 25 H
ABSOLUTE
PRESSURE GAGE
1/4 OF 1% FULL
SCALE ACCURACY
V7
PORT2A
PORT
V7A
FIGURE 2
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Section 6.0
Materials Analysis
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MATERIALS ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Contaminant particles associated with the OPB ASI Check Valve were discovered and
retrieved for subsequent analysis both during the process of valve disassembly and from
within the valve after disassembly was completed. Five white particles (identified as "A"-
"E" in Table 1) were retrieved from the Aclar sheet covering the disassembly work bench
after the disassembly was complete (The particle identified as "F" in Table 1 was
subsequently determined to be a fragment from particle "E".). White contaminants were
observed trapped between the poppet and the valve body before the valve was
disassembled, but could not be retrieved before disassembly. It was not possible to
correlate the particles found after disassembly with the observations made prior to
disassembly because of the limited visibility of the contaminants prior to disassembly.
One white particle was found on the adhesive side of the "LOX tape" used to seal off the
valve inlet during the disassembly process. One large black particle was located on the
upstream side of the valve poppet outboard of the valve sealing land after the valve was
disassembled. Black residue consisting of two denser clusters (approximately .020" dia.)
and a background of very fine dust was also observed on the upstream side of the valve
poppet inside the hollow poppet stem. A thin transparent interference film of residue was
noted on the poppet sealing surface of the valve body and was collected with a nylon
swab for analysis. The contaminants, a brief description of their location relative to the
check valve, their dimensions, and the analysis results, are summarized in Table 1.
The valve body, valve poppet, and spring were visually inspected with a binocular
microscope. Particular attention was given to the hardfaced sealing surfaces on both the
valve body and the valve poppet, and no discrepancies or damage were observed. Very
light scuffing was observed on the surface of the spring coils where rubbing with the valve
body had occurred, but this is considered typical. The Teflon sleeve on the poppet stem
was inspected and no discrepancies were observed.
RESULTS
Black Contaminants
The large black particle from the upstream surface of the valve poppet is shown in
Figures 1-3. The appearance and resiliency of this particle suggested that it might be a
sliver sliced from the inner diameter of an 0-ring. From the cross-section shown in Figure
3 it can be observed that the particle is a portion of a ring with a round cross section.
The rounded surface is the original molded surface of the contaminant with ridges
concentric with the center of the ring, and the flat surface was rough, indicative of having
been sheared from a larger object. The particle was cut in half to permit destructive
Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) Spectroscopic analysis and conserve the remainder for
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subsequent analysis by other techniques. Approximately one-third of the remaining half
was examined in the Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) and an elemental chemical
analysis was performed by x-ray Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS). The resulting
EDS spectrum, Figure 4, clearly indicates the particle is not a Fluorocarbon elastomer,
i.e. Viton, by the absence of a Fluorine x-ray peak, nor is it a Silicone indicated by the
relative small Silicon x-ray peak. The presence of both Sulfur and Zinc, however, imply
the particle is probably a rubber compound, and the similarity with an EDS spectrum
subsequently obtained from an exemplar Nitrile 0-ring, shown for comparison in Figure
5, should be noted. The contaminant EDS spectrum also contains small peaks for
several metallic elements which would correspond to the fine metallic debris which was
observed occasionally on the surface of the black contaminant during the SEM
examination. The FTIR specimen was prepared by pulverizing the sample and dispersing
it in a Potassium Bromide (KBR) pellet. The subsequent FTIR spectrum of the black
contaminant matches the KBR spectrum prepared from the exemplar Nitrile O-ring, as
shown in Figure 6. (The difficulty initially experienced in identifying the black contaminant
was a consequence of using FTIR reference spectra prepared using the pyrolate
technique for specimen preparation.) The identification of the black contaminant as Nitrile
was subsequently confirmed by an independent FTIR analysis performed by an outside
laboratory (Scanning Electron Analysis Laboratories, Inc.). The exemplar Nitrile O-ring
used for comparison was a MS28775-012 O-ring which would be used in the check valve
fine clean flushing fixture tool (T-5701004-303).
The original dimensions of the O-ring were estimated from the photographs of the
fragment (Figures 1-3). Although the radius of curvature for the O-ring diameter is
somewhat distorted, it was estimated that the original inside diameter was 7/16". The
MS28775-012 O-ring has an inside diameter of 3/8". Likewise, the thickness of the O-ring
was estimated at between 0.045" and 0.070" from the varying radius of curvature
observed in Figure 3. The nominal thickness of a MS28775-012 O-ring is 0.070".
The two black residue particle clusters on the inside of the hollow poppet stem were too
fragile to be removed intact for analysis. Insufficient material was removed to permit
FTIR analysis, however sufficient material was retrieved to allow EDS analysis, in the
SEM. The EDS analysis detected only carbon in the black residue and the SEM
examination also indicated that the residue was not electrically conductive, eliminating
graphite. With these characteristics, it was concluded that this black residue is most likely
residual combustion product of some contaminant present in the valve, possibly Nitrile.
An analysis of the potential for combustion to occur in the check valve in the event the
check valve is not fully closed during engine shut down is included in the appendix of this
report. No evidence for ignition, surface melting, or local heating (heat tint) was observed
on any of the valve details.
White Contaminants
The five white particles, Figure 7, retrieved from the Aclar sheet after the valve was
disassembled were analyzed by FTIR for identification. The particle identified as "A" was
determined to be a thin piece of nylon with an adhering cotton fiber. The particles
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identified as "B" and "C" were both cotton, with "B" having the appearance of fabric and
"C" appeared as a balled up length of thread. Particles "D" and "E" were both solid
fragments of nylon. The particle found on the adhesive side of the "LOX tape" (RB0195-
002) was identified as a cotton fiber. The dimensions of these particles are summarized
in Table 1. Numerous sources for both the nylon and cotton exist within the Rocketdyne
manufacturing areas.
Sealing Surface Residue
The nylon swab that was used to wipe the seal land of the valve body was analyzed by
FTIR. Insufficient material was present on the swab to draw any conclusion.
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ME&T CONTAMINATION ANALYSES RESULTS - SSME 2011
RS0080 59- 141 CHECK VALVE, S/N 4873034(R0010828-031 CHECK VALVE LINE ASSY, S/N 4925685)
IDCR 987174 (#1)
PARTICLE
LABEL
A
B
C
D
E
F
BLACK
RESIDUE
BLACK
PARTICLE
POPPET
SEAL
SURFACE
TAPE
CONT.
DIMENSIONS(INCHES)
.045 X .011 X
.002
.104 X .015
.041 X .038
.045 X .025 X
.005
.077 X .040 X
.004
.022 X .010
-
.146 X .046 X
.018
—
.096 X .023
IDENTIFICATION
NYLON W/ COTTON
FIBER
COTTON
COTTON
NYLON
NYLON
NYLON
MAJOR CARBON
NITRILE RUBBER
INSUFFICIENT
SAMPLE PRESENT
FOR CONCLUSIVE
RESULTS
COTTON
COMMENTS
AFTER CUT APART, GATHERED FROM
ACLAR SURFACE FOLLOWING VALVE
DISASSEMBLY
If
If
tf
If
MOST LIKELY FROM PARTICLE E
LOCATED UNDER POPPET CAP
LOCATED ON POPPET FACE
SWAB SAMPLE TAKEN OF POPPET
SEAL FACES
LOCATED ON ADHESIVE SIDE OF
TAPE USED AS MASK FOR VALVE
INLET
TABLE 1
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. Large black particle found on upstream side of poppet outboard of sealing
surface after valve disassembly. (1 div = 1mm)
Figure 2. Large black particle found on upstream side of poppet outboard of sealing
surface after valve disassembly. (1 div = 1mm)
Figure 3. Cross section of large black particle found on upstream side of poppet outboard
of sealing surface after valve disassembly. (44X)
Figure 4. Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS) spectrum of large black particle found
on poppet.
Figure 5. Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS) spectrum of exemplar Nitrile O-ring
(MS28775-012).
Figure 6. Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) spectra of large black particle found on
poppet and exemplar Nitrile O-ring (MS28775-012).
Figure 7. The five white particles retrieved from the Aclar sheet after valve disassembly.
(11X)
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RS008059-141 CHECK VALVE, S/N 4873034 SSME 2011
NITRILE RUBBER PARTICLE 1 DIV = 1mm
FIGURE 1
RSS008059-141 CHECK VALVE, S/N 4873034 SSME 2011
NITRILE RUBBER PARTICLE 1 DIV - 1mm
FIGURE 2
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RS008059-141 CHECK VALVE, S/N 4873034 SSME 2011
NITRILE RUBBER PARTICLE CROSS SECTION 44.IX
FIGURE 3
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PARTICLES A, B, C, D, E 10.9X
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Buna-N (Nitrite) Ignition Analysis
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BUNA-N IGNITION ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
SSME Aerothermodynamics studied the implications of the Buna-N particle contamination
and the carbon (soot) deposit that were found in the OPB ASI check valve of main engine
3. Specifically, various analyses supported the scenario that backflow of oxygen through
the check valve during engine start was most probably due to the Buna-N particle
contamination, and that the carbon residual was a by-product of the same, or similar non-
LOX compatible material, that ignited within the valve.
The mechanism for Buna-N particle heating and ignition associated with the backflow of
oxygen is explored analytically. Estimates are made of the extent of damage to the valve
metal components in the event that the Buna-N particle combustion generated sufficient
heat to cause metal ignition. It is concluded that while the potential to ignite Buna-N
particles larger than that found in engine 2011 was created by the oxygen backflow, the
damage to the metal, in the worst particle and metal burning orientation, would have been
contained by the limited amount of time available for metal to burn prior to the helium
purge taking effect. However, it also becomes evident from these studies that the fuel-
like behavior of a contaminant like Buna-N, in proximity to the oxygen environment in the
preburner domes, cannot be taken lightly, and that efforts to rid the engine of such
contamination remains the best protective measure that will ensure against the potential
for catastrophic engine failure.
Oxygen Backflow and Adiabatic Compression
Purge line pressure data from Figure 1 shows oxygen obviously backflowed into the
purge system. Using typical OPB chamber pressure data from short engine ignition tests,
the timeline of Figure 2 was constructed. Here it is shown that oxygen can backflow into
the purge line from roughly 1.0 to 1.8 seconds after engine start, driven by the increasing
OPB dome pressure (OPB chamber pressure is shown rather than dome pressure since
the latter is not measured). Later, from 1.8 to 2.04 seconds, it appears that the high OPB
chamber pressure reduced the valve poppet gap for leakage by squeezing the particle,
such that the PCA overboard drain began to reduce the purge system pressure.
However, at 2.04 seconds, the helium purge is introduced at 750 psia and rapid
compression of the oxygen in the purge lines follows.
Given the filling time of between 1.0 to 1.8 seconds, it can be estimated that the shaded
line at 012.1.4 shown in Figure 3 was full of oxygen prior to the compression phase.
Assuming proportional volume displacement, the 750 psia helium purge would drive an
estimated 0.28 in3 of compressed oxygen into the bore of the ASI check valve poppet.
The gox would fill 4 inches of the 0.305 inch diameter cylindrical bore as indicated in
Figure 4. This translates to a total mass of the oxygen of 0.00036 Ib. at 750 psia,
available for ignition of the Buna-N.
The potential for starting ignition in gaseous oxygen systems due to adiabatic compres-
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sion is well accepted by those who work with combustion phenomena, and consideration
of this process is typically a part of the design of such systems. Various articles,
(examples can be found in references 2 to 5), uniformly approach the formulation of this
process by an isentropic compression of an ideal gas from some initial pressure p1 to a
higher pressure p2. From gas dynamics, the increase in the pressure is accompanied by
an increase in the gas temperature from T, to T2 given by,
T/T, = [ p2/Pl] "•'*
where k is the ratio of specific heats for the gas. For oxygen, at the pressures and
temperatures of interest, k= 1.5, and the exponent of the pressure ratio is (k-1) /k = 1/3.
This gives an absolute temperature ratio T/T, = 2.32 for a pressure ratio of 750/60= 12.5.
As shown in Figure 4, a final temperature of T2= 1160°R is obtained from an initial
temperature of T,= 500°R. Since the compression of the oxygen would proceed rather
quickly, non-isentropicity of the unsteady flow would yield a slightly higher temperature,
but this effect is neglectable. Further, it should be mentioned that an initial pressure
lower than 60 psia would lead to a higher pressure ratio and thus a higher final tempera-
ture. This suggests that the worst case GOX temperature can be attained when the
backflow rate is just the right magnitude that the lines fill but do not pressurize above 20
psia. This can result in a final temperature of 1680°R after the compression, but with only
20/60= 1/3 of the mass of compressed oxygen in the valve poppet bore shown in Figure
4.
Buna-N Particle Heating Analysis
The study of the Buna-N particle heating from 2.04 to 2.8 seconds was simplified by
using idealized spherical particles, with the original intent of relating the results to the
round spot formed by the soot trace found at the base of the poppet. The surface
temperatures of the particles were predicted for various events in the timeline of Figure
2, using the best estimates of the fluid conditions within the valve, and starting with a
uniform temperature of 485°R due to the GN2 purge prior to engine start. The Schneider
chart I61 for the 1-D transient solutions for a sphere, suddenly exposed to uniform
convection from a fluid environment, was used in the prediction of the surface
temperature. The results are tabulated in Figure 5.m
A criteria that can be used to decide if the Buna-N is going to ignite is to compare the
calculated surface temperature shown in Figure 5 at 2.8 seconds to the predicted
autoignition temperature of the material. However, the ignition temperature reported in
the literature varies considerably according to the test method, the heating conditions
used in the tests (which is not even similar to the fast adiabatic compression heating),
and the condition of the material. For instance, the flash and fire points for Buna-N were
reported to be 791 °R (331 °F) in 2200 psia GOX for 70 Durometer hardness material.181
The method in this case relies on gasification of the volatiles in the nitrile rubber to initiate
and sustain ignition with a spark located 3/4 inch above the specimen. Using this as the
ignition temperature criteria and comparing it to the calculated surface temperatures in
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Figure 5, it is concluded that spherical particles 0.1 inch diameter and greater cannot be
ignited up to 2.87 seconds when the oxygen is purged out of the valve. However, older
reports indicate that shavings of Buna-N material of presumably smaller size were ignited
at 743°R (283°F) in 750 psia flowing GOX. This temperature is still higher than the usual
upper service temperature limit for nitrite rubber of 250°F. With this as the ignition
temperature criteria, even 0.1 inch diameter particles can be ignited in the given time,
although no time will be left for metal ignition.
Subsequently, it was decided that other models of the particle heating process were also
necessary for the various particle orientations explored for Buna-N ignition as shown in
Figure 6.P1 For a block-like piece, the worst orientations for particle heating are cases D
and E, where the particle can be heated simultaneously from two faces around a corner.
In these situations, and in those where an irregularly shaped particle can have a thin
section heated from both sides, the time to raise the surface temperature to autoignition
may be significantly reduced. In particular, for case D in Figure 6, heating only from the
narrow edge as a semi-infinite solid, the surface temperature can reach 791 °R in 0.25
second. This leaves 0.55 second for the particle to bum and ignite metal out of the
available time of 2.87 - 2.04= 0.8 second. The subject of Buna-N ignition is discussed
in the next section.
Buna-N Particle Combustion - Scope of Analysis
The amount of energy release and the distribution of that energy from the ignited Buna-N
particle depend on several variables that are classified into three groups as follows. First,
there are the particle's orientation, size, and shape. Second, there are the combustion
and flame spread characteristics of Buna-N, which include the ignition temperature
discussed in the previous section, the heat of combustion, the flame temperature; and the
burn rate. Third and not necessarily of least significance, there are the fluid mechanics
and heat transfer mechanisms involved in the combustion, which include the type of
flame, and the manner by which oxygen and fuel is accessed by or supplied to the flame,
and the manner by which the products are expelled from the combustion zone. It quickly
became obvious that it was impossible to answer all the questions related to these
parameters in the 5 weeks devoted to the study of the STS-55 anomaly, particularly when
it also became evident that metal ignition, which has its own similar set of parameters,
also required serious consideration. Therefore, the approach taken was to utilize
available data whenever possible, but to be conservative in the interpretation and
application of such data from whatever source to the thermal models, whenever there
were relevant questions that could not be clearly answered by these data.
The first group of parameters mentioned above is effectively explored by the cases shown
in Figure 6. Sustained combustion of the particle in cases D and E of Figure 6 is
considered to be most severe due to the more intimate contact between the Buna-N and
the metal. It is in this situation where a laminar diffusion flame of a burning solid fuel (the
Buna-N particle) will produce a flamefront that will be closest to the metal surface, and
where the heat transfer from the flame and the combustion gases to the metal would be
most intense. The earlier analytical efforts related to the baseline orientation case A, and
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the other cases B and C, were therefore quickly surpassed by the more important cases
D and E. The baseline model is discussed first below, followed by the severe case D.
Buna-N particle Combustion - Baseline Model
This model immediately showed the importance of the second group of variables.
Uncertainties were uncovered in the flame temperature, the burn rate, and therefore, the
amount of heat delivered to the metal. The flame temperature was originally assumed
to be 4800°R based on the "adiabatic temperatures" of 4815°R and 4890°R found in the
literature for Buna-N volatiles Butadiene and Acrylonitrile, respectively, burning in
atmospheric air.1101 A flame temperature of 5400°R corresponding to the stoichiometric
temperature for natural gas was also used for sensitivity studies, as it was suggested that
the volatiles of Buna-N will burn similar to natural gas.
An attempt to measure the Buna-N flame temperature in still air at Rocketdyne's Material
Engineering laboratory yielded 1760°R (1300°F).'111 From this data, and a heat of reaction
of 15,250 Btu/lb (8400 cal/g) from LowrieI121ia heat of formation for solid Buna-N was
calculated to be 4650 Btu/lb (2570 cal/g) assuming complete stoichiometric burning in air.
This information was then used to compute a stoichiometric flame temperature in pure
GOX of 4320°R. An increase of 500°R from 4320°R is well justified for burning in 750
psia oxygen rather than 14.7 psia. However, it should be pointed out that dissociation
of the stable species occurs at temperatures significantly above 2250°R (see for example
Classman'13'), such dissociation would tend to lower the flame temperature. At this point,
it was decided that the flame temperature of 4800°R was reasonable and adequately
conservative. The Buna-N particle was modelled as 50% C4H6 (Butadiene) and 50%
C3H3N (Acrylonitrile). The actual composition is more like 50% volatiles, 45% carbon
filler, and 5% binding agent. It was determined from a thermal gravimetric analysis1111 with
slow heating in air that the volatiles gasified and oxidized first, followed shortly by the
carbon, at a temperature as low as 15708R (600°C).
Next came the quandary on the ignition characteristics and burn rate of Buna-N. A burn
rate of 0.4 in/sec was obtained from the same type of test at the Rocketdyne's Materials
Engineering laboratory in which the flame temperature was measured. The test uses a
Bunsen burner to start ignition of the Buna-N sample from the bottom edge. The Bunsen
burner is then removed and the flame is allowed to propagate upwards, lengthwise of the
sample. The sample is 1/16 inch thick, 12 inches long and 2.5 inches wide. The burn
rate from this type of test is strongly enhanced by the buoyancy of the hot combustion
products, because the plume of the products rises and engulfs the unburned portion of
the specimen as the burning proceeds.
Since for the baseline particle orientation the flame can start from the edges or the top
face, and proceed both horizontally and vertically downward through the thickness, the
flame spread will not be buoyancy assisted as in the case of the upward propagation
tests in the laboratory. Thus it is suspected that the burn rate can be significantly slower
than 0.4 in/sec. However, what is strongly buoyancy controlled in the baseline particle
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orientation case is the emission of the hot combustion products into the GOX column and
the helium above the GOX, such that a large percentage of the heat released by the
combustion is transferred to the surrounding gas by convective mixing and not to the
metal, and the bum rate becomes a less significant factor to the metal heating. Thus for
the baseline case, a bum rate of 0.4 in/sec through the particle thickness was used to
estimate the time of heating of the metal from the burning Buna-N.
The heat transfer was done conservatively with a high heat transfer coefficient value of
4000 Btu/hr-ft2-°R and a flame temperature of 4800°R. The value of the heat transfer
coefficient translates to a constant flamefront to metal distance of 50 [i inches. The
results are shown in Figure 7. A block 0.160 inch thick with a base area of 0.146 inch
x 0.046 inch would have to be consumed before the metal surface temperature can reach
the ignition point of 2800°R. Only 10% of the heat of combustion of the Buna-N
consumed is transferred to the metal, and the particle will be consumed in 0.40 second.
This particle is equivalent to a 1/8 inch diameter sphere, which based on the heating
studies is unlikely to be autoignited in 0.8 seconds.
Buna-N Particle Combustion - Worst Orientation
Once the burning of the Buna-N is started, it is expected that the volatiles would continue
to sublimate due to heating from the flame, and react with the oxygen such that a thin
stoichiometric flame layer is formed that closely follows the receding surface of the solid
Buna-N. For the case of the worst oriented particle burning from the inboard edge, this
suggests a moving flamefront with the flame and the outflow of the combustion products
simultaneously contributing to the heat transfer to the metal. This condition is sketched
in Figure 8. Obviously in this case, the burn rate becomes a significant factor, as it
controls the amount of time that the two metal surfaces close to the Buna-N will be
exposed to the flame and the hot gas products.
Glassman113-141 and Williams'151 both detail condensed phase burning theory, and both
provide the same model for estimating the fuel vaporization rate (in effect the burn rate)
due to the laminar diffusion flame. From this model, a burn rate as low as 0.05 inch/sec
was calculated. With a wide range for the burn rate from 0.05 to 0.4 in/sec, a parametric
analysis was conducted on a pseudo-3D thermal model of the poppet and valve body
interface.
The pseudo-3D thermal model developed by Tri Tran is described in Figure 9. The pie
section corresponding to the particle location was collapsed into one axisymmetric plane.
Due to the added complication of tracking the melted portion of the metal in the modeling,
and the limited time available for the study, a full 3D model was avoided. The result of
this analysis is depicted in Figure 10.1161 For a temperature of 4800°R for the Buna-N
flame, a burn rate of 0.12 in/sec or lower would bring the Haynes 188 to melting and
ignition. For a particle width equal to the 0.036 inch poppet sealing face, the Buna-N will
be consumed and the metal will reach ignition temperature in 0.3 second. Adding to this
the time required to autoignite the Buna-N particle, there remains 0.80 - (0.30 + 0.25) =
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0.25 second for metal ignition. This is the topic of the following sections.
Haynes 188 Metal Ignition - Scope of Analysis
The Glassman criteria for the burning of condensed phases, (i.e., liquids and solids), can
be extended to the combustion of metals.'141 But as to be expected, metals have different
burning characteristics compared to typical solid or liquid combustibles or fuels. The
important characteristics that apply to the current problem relate to the mechanics of the
melting, the flame structure, and the oxidation of the metallic element or elements if the
metal is an alloy. The ASTM publications in references 2 to 5 can be consulted for more
recent articles particular to promoted metals ignition. Also, found relevant to the situation
studied here are the recent papers by Sato et. al. on metal fire spread,117-18>191 the earlier
paper by Dean and Thompsonpo1 with data on ignition characteristics of Cobalt based
alloy Haynes 25, and the paper by Grosse and Conway1211 for general metals combustion
and properties of metal oxides. In particular, Dean and Thompson report ignition of
Haynes 25 occurred within the melt range of around 2800°R, with up to 70% of the rod
specimens consumed at a pressure of 300 psia in the promoted ignition tests.
Two possible scenarios for metal burning are arrived at.1221 The burn rate and flame
temperature is expected to be dictated by the oxide vaporization, and the rate would be
slow. This is called the "oxide inhibited" case, and would occur if the valve is oriented
reasonably upright to gravity as shown in Figure 11 a such that a pool of molten metal and
oxide is formed between the flame and the solid metal. The other case, more severe
from the "burnthrough" standpoint, allows for gravity assisted removal of the molten
material in the case of a valve that is upside down relative to gravity (Figure 11b). In this
case, fresh solid metal preheated by conduction effects is steadily exposed to the flame,
and the flow of the molten material itself can help spread the burning. This is called the
"oxide noninhibited" case.
Haynes 188 Metal Ignition - Oxide Inhibited
The elemental composition of Haynes 188 is shown in Figure 12, together with the
respective oxides, and the available data on the melting and boiling points of both from
various sources. The highest oxide boiling temperature belongs to the oxide of
Chromium, Cr203, equal to 5940°R. Based on previous experience with metals ignition,
(see Glassman1141 and Sato1191 for example), the flame temperature for vapor phase
burning can be expected to be that of the oxide if the boiling point of the oxide is higher
than the boiling point of the element. Since this is true except for the 14.55 Tungsten
present in Haynes 188, the boiling point of Cr203 was used for the flame temperature in
the thermal model. It is interesting to note from Figure 12 that although pure Tungsten
has high melting and boiling points, the melting and the boiling of its oxide, W03 occur
at lower temperatures. As anticipated, the 1-D model of the poppet wall developed by
Jim Depsky for the oxide inhibited burning predicted only 0.008 inch depth of molten
metal after 0.25 second.
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Haynes 188 Metal Ignition - Oxide Noninhibited
The pseudo-30 model used for the Buna-N particle burning study was used also in the
oxide noninhibited burning of Haynes 188. An effective heat transfer coefficient of 6000
Btu/hr-tf-'R was used with the flame temperature of 59408R. The heat transfer
coefficient was obtained by iteration with the 1-D model to match a mean fire spread rate
of 0.3 inch/second reported by Sato for a 0.146 inch diameter steel rod, burning upward
from an end. It should be emphasized here that this burn rate, and therefore the heat
transfer coefficient derived from it, is conservative when applied to the model, in that the
rod burning method used in Sato's promoted ignition tests is a more severe condition than
burning from a finite area on the surface of the poppet. For rod burning, the continuous
formation and detachment of the molten metal globule accelerates the metal removal, and
only a small fraction of the metal that melts reacts with the oxygen prior to detachment
of the globule. The detachment is of course a function of the surface tension of the
molten metal, and for rod burning a simple force balance gives a molten mass globule
diameter of 2 to 3 times the rod diameter. This implies that only about 1/5 of the metal
melted reacts with oxygen, and the rest forms the globule that detaches intermittently as
combustion proceeds.
The metal depth consumed based on Tri Tran's pseudo-3D model of the oxide
noninhibited burning is plotted as a function of burn time in Figure 13, together with the
oxide inhibited case discussed earlier. The melting for the oxide noninhibited case
penetrates to 0.043 inch in 0.25 second, and does not burn through the poppet thickness
of 0.155 inch even if the burn time is somehow extended to 0.50 second. The total
amount of oxygen available within the valve at the onset of the metal ignition is consumed
in 0.37 second. The heat transfer coefficient of 6,000 Btu/hr-ft2 -°R and flame
temperature of 5940°R used in the model in effect forces heating of the remaining solid
Haynes 188 by 50% of the equivalent heat of combustion of the metal melting. This
should be conservative since the 0.3 inch/second burn rate, derived from rod burning data
for steel is conservative. Rod burning confines the heat to the axis direction, whereas a
disc that starts burning on a finite area of one face actually has considerable 3-D
conduction effects that spreads the heat.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. The backflow of oxygen into the purge valves and lines during engine start leads to
compressive heating of the oxygen during shutdown.
2. The compressive heating of the oxygen in turn can cause ignition of contaminant
particles up to 0.1 inch diameter that are incompatible with gaseous oxygen, and can
lead to metal ignition.
3. The damage to the metal due to ignition will be contained by the limited time
available for combustion before the helium purge takes into effect, even in the worst
case particle orientation.
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Section 8.0
NASA Level-l and STS-56 L-2 Close out Briefing
8-1
RSS-8898
6/23/93
STS-55 PAD ABORT
LEVEL-I CLOSEOUT BRIEFING
The results of the team investigation were presented by Byron Wood to the NASA Level
I PRCB via telecon on 3/31/93 and to the Mission Management Team (STS-56 L-2 Day)
on 4/4/93 at KSC. The investigation findings and rationale to fly STS-56 (OV103) were
included in the presentation.
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TOTOL UNIQUE
HIGH FLOW
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
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ENG
2005
2006
2007
2011
2011
2012
2012
2015
2015
2015
2017
2017
2017
2018
2018
2019
2019
2020
2021
2022
2022
2023
2024
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2107
2109
26
FPB
PURGE
cm
4888926
4888925
4889218
4106979
4874582
4105343
4888926
4106974
4106974
4873031
4863478
4877126
4877126
2094299
4920786
4876579
4876579
4875718
2726729
4921242
4921242
4105330
4920787
4920786
4874320
4921465
4872535
4921467
4873629
4873629
2033348
2821028
2104802
4863479
4872534
4104667
29
OPB
PURGE
C112
4912548
4889925
4889924
4881780
4877703
4104141
4887244
4878925
4889925
4920791
2156439
4875722
4877702
4862278
4920795
4874586
4877700
4877702
4875721
4877128
4877128
4881293
2797732
4889925
4873632
2790406
2792325
4875722
4873032
4912548
4871051
4863603
4862585
4862279
4920795
4887244
28
HIGH FLOW
MCC
DOME
C113
4887239
4889978
4888651
4106980
4874581
4105328
4887239
4106975
4887239
4921466
2094297
4877125
4877125
4862276
4876428
4876578
4876427
4875717
4876082
2716711
2805903
4874963
4876428
4106980
4874964
4923524
2805902
4923478
4876081
4876081
2033838
2082840
4863602
2113436
4874319
4915020
30
TOTAL UNIQUE ALL C
FPB
ASI
C116
4888654
4889220
4888927
4879256
4884783
4882674
2792327
4878926
4878926
2033845
2033347
4876601
4876601
4862281
4876600
4877701
4877701
4874698
4876084
4875720
4875720
4876605
2033844
4873631
4923477
4871550
4926348
4876600
4871052
4871052
2033843
4872536
4863605
4863482
4873033
4884783
29
/V'S
OPB
ASI
C117
4911844
4912544
4889223
4912549
4873034
4881294
4874321
4878102
4889223
4911844
4879255
4876599
4876599
4863606
4920789
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4876086
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4874966
4876085
4873035
4915018
4921642
4923476
4871549
4871552
4871053
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2033346
2084007
2084758
2084757
4920789
4884785
29
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